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INTRODUCTION 
Migrants are dying.1  Twenty-five-year-old Óscar Alberto Martínez Ramírez and his 
daughter, twenty-three-month-old Valeria, were found face down on the bank of the Río Grande 
                                                             
* Juris Doctor Candidate, American University Washington College of Law, 2021; Bachelor of Arts, American 
University, 2017. 
1 See Dept. of Homeland Sec., U.S. Border Patrol Fiscal Year Southwest Border Sector Deaths by Fiscal Year, 
https://www.cbp.gov/document/stats/us-border-patrol-fiscal-year-southwest-border-sector-deaths-fy-1998-fy-2018 
(documenting 283 deaths at the southwest border in 2018 and a total of 7,505 since 1998).  
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river last year.2  After they were unable to present themselves to U.S. authorities to request 
asylum, the father and daughter drowned during their final attempt to reach the United States.3  
Óscar and Valeria wanted a chance to present their asylum claim before U.S. officials, but 
instead faced the turbulent waters of the Río Grande, that chance at asylum forever swept away 
with them.4  Yes, immigration law is complicated,5 but human beings like Óscar and Valeria 
deserve a solution. 
 The United States’ immigration system is broken.6  Immigration courts currently face a 
backlog of over 900,000 cases.7  While asylum claims represent only a portion of the cases that 
immigration judges hear,8 it is a critical one at that.9  Individuals, regardless of their country of 
origin, have undeniable rights under both federal10 and international law11 to seek asylum in the 
United States.  
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA)12 establishes “split authority” over asylum 
adjudications.  Some applicants appear before asylum officers at the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS)13 while others are heard by immigration judges housed in the Executive Office 
for Immigration Review (EOIR) at the Department of Justice (DOJ).14  DHS asylum officers 
hear affirmative applications—those submitted by migrants within one year of their arrival to the 
                                                             
2 Peter Orsi & Amy Guthrie, A Grim Border Drowning Underlines Peril Facing Many Migrants, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (June 26, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/2f8422c820104d6eaad9b73d939063a9. 
3  See id. (describing that Óscar became frustrated and decided that his family’s only option was to attempt to cross 
the Río).  
4 Id. 
5 See U.S. Immigration Law: The Big Picture, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/us-immigration-
law-the-big-picture (“Widely considered more complex than the tax code, U.S. immigration law is not something 
you can learn in five minutes.  Sometimes it doesn’t even make logical sense.”). 
6 See, e.g., Amid “Nightmarish” Case Backlog, Experts Call for Independent Immigration Courts, A.B.A. (Aug. 9, 
2019), https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2019/08/amid-_nightmarish-case-backlog--
experts-call-for-independent-imm/ (imploring that action be taken to ensure migrants’ due process rights remain 
intact).  
7 See id. (quoting an immigration judge who called the current backlog “nightmarish”).  
8 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) (2006) (allowing migrants to appear before the immigration court to protest their removal 
orders); see also § 1421(b) (indicating that noncitizens in the process of becoming legal permanent residents or 
naturalized citizens also appear before the immigration court). 
9 See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 326-
27 (2007) (explaining that if asylum claims are not adjudicated fairly, they could result in an effective “death 
sentence” for those asylum seekers whose cases are wrongly decided).  
10 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (establishing that any “alien who is physically present in the United States or who 
arrives in the United States” may apply for asylum).  
11 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 14(1) (“Everyone has a right to seek and to enjoy in other 
countries asylum from persecution.”).  
12 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).  
13 See id. § 451(b)(3) (establishing that the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), an office of 
DHS, will have statutory authority to review asylum and refugee applications).  
14 See id. § 1102(3)(g)(1) (outlining that the EIOR is under the sole authority of the Attorney General).  





U.S.15  After submitting their initial application, affirmative asylum seekers are interviewed by 
DHS asylum officers who either make a final determination or refer the case to the immigration 
court for further review.16  Alternatively, those who are apprehended by DHS and placed in 
removal proceedings can still apply for asylum, though their applications are considered 
defensive.17  All defensive asylum claims are heard by immigration judges in the EOIR, which 
consists of fifty-eight lower immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), 
the appellate body with authority to review the lower courts’ decisions.18 
Thus, those responsible for upholding U.S. asylum laws are spread between two different 
agencies, each with its own area of expertise.19  Though such overlapping authority among 
administrative agencies is not uncommon,20 the adjudication of asylum claims deserves special 
attention.21  The fair adjudication of asylum applications demands intense fact-finding, 
individual credibility determinations, and up-to-date knowledge of the ever-changing 
international “push and pull” factors22 behind one’s decision to migrate.23  The historical and 
real-time expertise needed to determine the credibility of a migrant’s claim, coupled with the 
emotional and psychological intelligence necessary to ensure a holistic understanding are what 
make asylum adjudication unique.24   
                                                             
15 See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 9, at 307; see also The Affirmative Asylum Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND 
IMMIGR. SERVS. (last updated April 19, 2019), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-
asylum/asylum/affirmative-asylum-process.  
16 See The Affirmative Asylum Process, supra note 15.  
17 See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 9, at 305-06.  
18 Id.  
19 See infra Part.II.B.  
20 See infra Part.II.A.; see also Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and Statutory 
Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 237, 238 (2011) (describing common criticism of regulatory overlap on the 
ground that intersecting jurisdiction of administrative agencies leads to duplicative and sometimes contradictory 
regulation which inhibits efficiency).  
21 See infra notes 146-147 and accompanying text.  
22 See generally Andrew R. Arthur, Looking for Push Factors in Central America, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Oct. 
18, 2018), https://cis.org/Arthur/Looking-Push-Factors-Central-America (explaining that push factors are those that 
force an individual to move, because the individual may be at risk if he stays, and pull factors are those factors in the 
destination country that attract an individual to leave his home).  
23 See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 9, at 306 
Asylum decisions, whether by asylum officers or immigration judges, involve both a judgment 
about whether the applicant’s story, if true, would render the applicant eligible for asylum under 
American law and an assessment as to whether the applicant is telling the truth about his or her 
personal experiences of actual or threatened persecution. 
(emphasis added).  
24 Cf. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (emphasizing that because 
regulations are often complicated and convoluted, executive agencies are to have superior expertise in the niche 
areas of the law over which they preside).  
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With so many shifting variables, there is a heightened need for uniformity in asylum 
adjudication to ensure due process.25  However, such uniformity in the application of 
immigration laws is lacking,26 and major disparities in adjudication persist throughout the 
immigration court system.27  Officials in both agencies are forced to dance on a tightrope 
dividing the legal from the political and facts from emotions, inevitably destined to fall.   
Honoring migrants’ due process rights should be at the center of any attempt at 
immigration reform.28  Despite the constant skepticism and increased scrutiny that DHS has 
faced under the current administration,29 there is no reason to think that the agency handcrafted 
to execute the nation’s immigration laws is any less capable of doing so than the other executive 
agencies that came before it.30  Instead of bolstering more attacks against DHS and the 
immigration court system, Congress should take care of unfinished business and provide DHS 
the statutory authority it needs to work efficiently.31  The lower immigration courts and BIA 
should be relocated to DHS, the agency where expertise in immigration matters truly lies.32  In 
turn, moving the immigration court system to DHS would make the agency more independent,33 
                                                             
25 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (holding that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
forbids the government from “depriv[ing]” any “person . . . of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law,” including 
migrants). 
26 See 2019 Update Report – Reforming the Immigration System – Proposals to Promote Independence, Fairness, 
Efficiency, and Professionalism in the Adjudication of Removal Cases, A.B.A. COMMISSION OF IMMIGR. (March 
2019) at UD 2-5 (pointing out that wide disparities in asylum grant rates, both between and within particular 
immigration courts, persist).  
27 See id.  
In FY 2017, immigration judges granted asylum claims in approximately 20% of cases 
nationwide.  However, a number of immigration courts granted asylum claims at a significantly 
lower or higher rate than the national average, and at significantly higher or lower rates even when 
compared to immigration courts of comparable size.  
28 See Immigration Court Independence, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR., 
https://www.immigrantjustice.org/issues/immigration-court-independence 
 (“Due process rights and impartiality must be paramount in immigration court.”).   
29 See Matt Ford, Dismantle the Department of Homeland Security, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 21, 2018), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/147099/dismantle-department-homeland-security (“The case for abolishing the 
wasteful, incompetent, and abusive mega-agency has become especially urgent under Trump.”).  
30 See About Us, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS. (last updated March 6, 2018), 
https://www.uscis.gov/aboutus (describing USCIS as the office tasked with “administer[ing] the nation’s lawful 
immigration system).  
31 See Susan B. Glasser & Michal Grunwald, Department’s Mission Was Undermined From Start, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 22, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/21/AR2005122102327_pf.html 
(“To some extent, the department was set up to fail.  It was assigned the awesome responsibility of defending the 
homeland without the investigative, intelligence and military powers of the FBI, CIA and the Pentagon.”). 
32 See infra Part.II. 
33 See infra Part.II.C.; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional 
Design, 89 TEX. L.REV. 15, 26 (emphasizing that there is no exhaustive list of mechanisms that must be employed to 
insulate an agency from outside political influence, rather there exist various and ever-changing ways in which 
agency independence can be achieved).  





thus creating an after-effect that could garner bipartisan support—a robust asylum adjudication 
process honoring migrants’ constitutional right to due process while still prioritizing DHS’s 
security concerns. 
Part I.A.34 of this Comment briefly traces executive agency authority over the 
immigration court system prior to September 11, 2001.  Part I.B.35 discusses the state of the 
lower immigration courts and the BIA after 9/11 with the creation of DHS.  Part I.C.36 addresses 
two consequential decisions that took place during DHS’s creation, highlighting the ongoing 
need for a solution.  Part II37 explains the significance of agency expertise in administrative law.  
Part II.A.38 utilizes Gonzales v. Oregon39 to highlight the role that expertise plays when statutes 
establish “split authority” among agencies.  Part II.B.40 argues that DHS should oversee the 
immigration court system—thus all asylum adjudications—by examining the HSA’s legislative 
history, the DOJ’s lack of resources and specialized knowledge to adequately manage the legal 
and emotional complexities involved in making asylum determinations, and the DOJ’s own 
rhetoric about its mission.  Part II.C.41 describes how the relocation of the lower immigration 
courts and the BIA will increase agency independence and result in a more robust delivery of due 
process for migrants.  Part III42 recommends relocation of the immigration court and the BIA to 
DHS through statutory amendment of the HSA.  Part III.A.43 details procedural “next steps” 
should the relocation take place.  
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND – IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION OVER TIME 
A. EXECUTIVE AGENCY AUTHORITY OVER IMMIGRATION BEFORE 9/11 
Statutes governing United States’ immigration laws are widely recognized as more 
convoluted than the tax code,44 and tracing the ebb and flow of the history of immigration law is 
no simpler.  While it is evident that the rhetoric surrounding immigration has been riddled with 
                                                             
34 See infra Part.I.A.  
35 See infra Part.I.B.  
36 See infra Part.I.C.  
37 See infra Part.II. 
38 See infra Part.II.A.  
39 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
40 See infra Part.II.B.  
41 See infra Part.II.C. 
42 See infra Part.III. 
43 See infra Part.III.A 
44 See U.S. Immigration Law, supra note 5.   
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xenophobic overtones since the country’s beginning45—a theme still present today46—the 
reasons behind the ever-shifting placement of key actors in the immigration system, like the 
lower immigration courts and the BIA, are not as apparent.  
Perhaps contributing to the country’s inability to fully understand what it takes to achieve 
progress on immigration is the complicated history of executive authority over immigration.  
1891 marked the implementation of the first major piece of immigration legislation, the 
Immigration Act of 1891,47 which officially placed immigration under federal control.48  The 
Immigration Act of 1891 established an Office of Immigration within the Department of the 
Treasury, allowing the Secretary of Treasury to review all immigration-related decisions.49  
Twelve years later, immigration responsibilities moved from the Department of the Treasury to 
the newly created Department of Commerce and Labor.50  Afterward, immigration authority was 
placed solely under the Department of Labor when the originally conjoined Department of 
Commerce and Labor split into two separate entities.51  The Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) was created in 1933 to spearhead immigration matters within the Department of 
Labor.52  Seven years later, the INS moved from the Department of Labor to DOJ, permitting the 
Attorney General to create the BIA, an adjudicatory body that reports solely to the Attorney 
General in reviewing appeals cases from the lower immigration courts.53  Finally, in 1983, the 
                                                             
45 See Howard S. Myers, III, Immigration Law: An Examination of America’s Immigration System at a Time of 
Uncertainty, 44 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 744, 746 (2018) 
Those who come hither are generally of the most ignorant Stupid Sort of their own Nation . . . and 
as few of the English understand the German Language, and so cannot address them either from 
the Press or Pulpit, ‘tis almost impossible to remove any prejudices they once entertain . . . Not 
being Liberty, they know not how to make a modest use of it. 
 (quoting Benjamin Franklin).  
46 See Michael D. Shear, Trump Presses His Argument of a Border Crisis in California Visit, N.Y. TIMES (April 5, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/05/us/politics/trump-border-wall.html (describing President Trump’s 
recent comments that the country is “full” and thus cannot “take” any more immigrants).  
47 See 26 Stat. 1084, 51 Cong. Ch. 551, Sec. 1 (outlining classes of “aliens” such as “idiots” and “insane persons” 
who would not be admitted to the country).  
48 See id. (enacting a federal law in the fifty-first session of the United States Congress); see generally Evolution of 
the U.S. Immigration Court System: Pre-1983, THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (last updated April 30, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/evolution-pre-1983.  
49 See Evolution of the U.S. Immigration Court System: Pre-1983, supra note 48 (explaining that the Office of 
Immigration had the authority to examine and exclude individuals seeking entry into the United States and deport 
individuals who violated the law while still allowing for an appeals process which the Secretary of Treasury could 
review).  
50 Id.   
51 Id.  
52 Id.  
53 See id. (emphasizing that the BIA has the sole authority to decide case appeals and reports directly to the Attorney 
General); see also 5 Fed. Reg. 3,502 (Sept. 4, 1940) (“In the exercise of the powers conferred upon it the Board of 
Immigration Appeals shall be responsible solely to the Attorney General.”).  





EOIR was created within DOJ—the executive body that continues to house the BIA and lower 
immigration courts today.54 
Created after an internal DOJ reorganization, the EOIR assumed authority over the BIA 
and the immigration judges who sit on lower immigration courts throughout the country.55  
Unlike before, the creation of the EOIR as a separate entity within DOJ aimed to make the 
immigration courts independent of the INS—the office tasked with enforcing federal 
immigration laws.56  The Director of the EOIR reports to the Deputy Attorney General.57  The 
EOIR’s stated goal is to “adjudicate immigration cases in a careful and timely manner.”58 
B. EXECUTIVE AGENCY AUTHORITY OVER IMMIGRATION AFTER 9/11 – THE CREATION OF 
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
The events of September 11, 2001 provided for yet another transformation in the way the 
country approached immigration.  While there is no doubt that 9/11 had lasting effects both 
domestically and internationally, some of those consequences are less visible than others.59  Few 
recognize the impact that September 11, 2001 had on our immigration system.60  
Just a week before 9/11, the climate around immigration reform seemed hopeful.61  On 
September 6, 2001, President George W. Bush welcomed Mexican President Vicente Fox to the 
White House, and the two leaders came close to reaching a comprehensive immigration reform 
plan.62  Though the two men considered each other friends,63 9/11 fundamentally changed the 
dynamic of not only their personal relationship, but also the diplomatic ties between the United 
                                                             
54 See 48 Fed. Reg. 8,038, 8,039 (Feb. 25, 1983).  
55 Id.; see also About the Office, THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (last updated Aug. 14, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office.  
56 See 48 Fed. Reg. 8,038, 8,039 (referencing goals to make immigration adjudication more “effective and 
efficient”).   
57 Id. at § 3.0. 
58 See About the Office, supra note 55 (“EOIR’s primary mission is to adjudicate immigration cases in a careful and 
timely manner, including cases involving detained aliens, criminal aliens, and aliens seeking asylum as a form of 
relief from removal, while ensuring the standards of due process and fair treatment for all parties involved.”).  
59 See generally 9/11 Attacks, HIST. (last updated May 21, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/9-11-
attacks (focusing predominantly on the U.S.’s swift military response to 9/11, Operation Enduring Freedom).  
60 See Myers, supra note 45, at 777 (explaining that 9/11 effectively rewrote an immigration agenda that had been 
leaning toward comprehensive reform and returned the focus toward national security and away from attempts at 
developing a pathway to citizenship).  
61 See America’s Story: An Immigrant Story, CARNEGIE, https://www.carnegie.org/interactives/immigration-
reform/#!/ (“Prior to September 11, President Bush had been moving away from the ‘get tough’ ethos that President 
Clinton [had] established . . .”).  
62 See id. (“If somebody is willing to do jobs others in America aren’t willing to do, we ought to welcome that 
person to the country, and we ought to make that a legal part of our economy.”) (quoting President George W. Bush 
during the state visit of Mexican President Vicente Fox on September 6, 2001, five days before 9/11).  
63 See Alfredo Corchado, Once Solid, the George W. Bush-Vicente Fox partnership faded after 9/11, DALLAS NEWS 
(April 2013), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/mexico/2013/04/27/once-solid-the-george-w-bush-vicente-fox-
partnership-faded-after-9-11/ (referring to the two leaders as “the two amigos”).  
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States and Mexico, bringing any progress on immigration reform to a halt.64  The momentum had 
officially shifted.65  As President Vicente Fox urged the United States to push forward on 
immigration reform in the aftermath of 9/11,66 legislators on Capitol Hill no longer focused on 
fulfilling the United States’ place on the world stage as a “country of immigrants.”67  Rather, 
President Bush and members of Congress alike doubled down on “border build-up plans and 
heightened restrictions on immigration.”68  Facing increased political pressure and public outcry, 
a skeptical President Bush signed the HSA into law, creating a new executive agency—DHS—
tasked with, among other things, securing the nation’s borders.69  
The creation of the new department was no easy endeavor and faced criticism from its 
inception.70  To this day, critics argue that DHS is nothing more than an instinctual reaction to 
the events of September 11, 2001 and have coined it “Frankenstein[’s] monster” of executive 
agencies.71  Before 9/11, DOJ acted as the “lead agency” tasked with combatting terrorism and 
ensuring national security.72  The HSA altered that makeup, combining twenty-two federal 
agencies into one and transferring the functions of those existing agencies that had even a remote 
connection to homeland security to the various units within DHS.73   
The placement of the EOIR was of utmost importance for the future of immigration law 
in the United States and the migrants whose lives depended on the fair adjudication of those 
laws.  Although the EOIR began functioning years before DHS in 1983, questions remained 
                                                             
64 See id. (“Gone were ambitious plans for immigration, and thrown into question was whether the two countries 
could overcome historical suspicion of each other to forge a stronger relationship.”).  
65 See Myers, supra note 45, at 777.  
66 See Ginger Thompson, Threats and Responses; After 9/11, Fox Still Waits for U.S. Moves on Mexico, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 13, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/13/world/threats-and-responses-after-9-11-fox-still-waits-for-
us-moves-on-mexico.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=012E890F22BE008D4FB6D224EBF17C06&gwt=pay 
(pointing out that President Fox “urged President Bush not to forsake his promise” to work with Mexico on issues 
including broad immigration reforms).  
67 See America’s Story, supra note 61 (highlighting that nearly one of every four Americans—70 million people—is 
an immigrant or the child of parents who came from another country); see also A Nation Built By Immigrants, 
GEORGE W. BUSH PRESIDENTIAL CTR. (2019), https://www.bushcenter.org/publications/resources-
reports/reports/immigration.html (emphasizing that immigrants “played a leading role in building what has become 
the most prosperous nation in the history of the world”).  
68 See Myers, supra note 45, at 777.  
69 Homeland Security Act of 2002, 107 Pub. L. No. 296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
70 See Jonathan Thessin, Department of Homeland Security, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 513, 516 (2003) (“Unlike most 
federal initiatives, homeland security draws upon the capabilities of a range of executive departments.”); see also 
Glasser & Grunwald, supra note 31, (“[T]he department was set up to fail.”).  
71 See Ford, supra note 29 (arguing that the Bush administration rallied around the term “homeland security” in 
response to the September 11 attacks); see also Matt Mayer, Why We Should Eliminate the Department of Homeland 
Security, REASON (June 23, 2015), https://reason.com/2015/06/23/president-bush-was-right-before-he-was-w/ 
(“Let’s dismantle the Frankenstein monster and divide its responsibilities more effectively.”).  
72 See Thessin, supra note 70, at 514.  
73 See Myers, supra note 45, at 744; see also Thessin, supra note 70, at 520 (“The new Department includes 
components from the Departments of Treasury, Justice, Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, 
Energy, and Defense.”). 





about whether Congress would relocate the EOIR and thus, the immigration courts and the BIA, 
to DHS as the new agency took shape.74  
C. CONSEQUENTIAL DECISIONS – ESTABLISHING “SPLIT AUTHORITY” OVER ASYLUM CLAIMS 
Ultimately, in enacting the HSA, Congress decided that the EOIR, home to the lower 
immigration courts and the BIA, should remain part of the DOJ.75  The reasoning behind this 
move to this day remains unclear.76  While the “experts”77 decided to relocate the United States’ 
immigration trial attorneys to DHS, immigration judges, on the other hand, were left out, 
destined to remain with the DOJ as part of the EOIR.78  Reports suggest that when pressed on the 
issue by Capitol Hill staffers, advisors to DHS’s future Secretary, Tom Ridge, conceded that they 
simply had not known that immigration courts existed and thus had never contemplated their 
relocation to the new department.79 
While the consequences of the experts’ ignorance are plentiful,80 one area in particular 
illustrates how this decision, or lack thereof, has led to a fundamental breakdown in due process 
for migrants—asylum.  The way in which decision makers process asylum claims best illustrates 
the logistical nightmare that such shared responsibility between DHS and the DOJ has created.  
Final asylum decisions are made either by asylum officers or immigration judges, depending on 
the type of application.81  The crux of the problem is that asylum officers are housed under 
DHS’s United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) throughout eight regional 
asylum offices,82 while immigration judges and the BIA remain part of the DOJ in the EOIR.83  
                                                             
74 About the Office, supra note 55.  
75 Homeland Security Act of 2002, 107 Pub. L. No. 296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
76 See Glasser & Grunwald, supra note 31 (“Some of the decisions were almost random.”) (“The plan had been put 
together with such speed and secrecy that after its release angry officials had to explain to the White House how 
their agencies really worked.”).  
77 Id. (describing that a “select group of policy aids” soon to be coined the “Gang of Five” had been secretly 
commissioned to plot the administration’s “about-face”).  
78 See Myers, supra note 45, 779 (outlining that the Homeland Security Act abolished the INS, which previously 
housed U.S. immigration trial attorneys, and created the United States Citizenship Services (USCIS)); see also Jason 
A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal Proceedings, 89 TULANE L. REV. 1, 5 (2014), 
available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/986 (establishing that today, immigration attorneys 
who represent the government in immigration court are part of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)).  
79 See Glasser & Grunwald, supra note 31 (describing the chaos that ensued on Capitol Hill when experts were 
“barraged by Hill staffers” to explain why if trial attorneys were being moved to the new department, immigration 
judges were staying with the DOJ).  
80 See generally Michael D. Shear et al., The U.S. Immigration System May Have Reached a Breaking Point, N.Y. 
TIMES (April 10, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/us/immigration-border-mexico.html (stating that 
although there have been warning signs that the immigration system has been on the brink of collapse for years, the 
time for ultimate failure may be right now).  
81 See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 9, at 305-06 (explaining that the asylum process is like playing a game of 
“roulette,” affirmative applications being reviewed by asylum officers at the DHS and defensive applications being 
reviewed by immigration judges at the DOJ). 
82 Id. at 306.  
83 Id. at 307.  
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Not only does this partition of authority make it impossible for DHS to efficiently do its job, but 
many times it also results in an unequal, and thus unconstitutional, adjudication of asylum 
seekers’ claims.84  Such statutory slice and dice is concerning and demands a solution, especially 
in this context, when it is not uncommon for asylum decisions to be a choice between life and 
death for the migrants depending on them.85  
It should come as no surprise that DHS faces continued criticism86 and little faith is put in 
the United States’ immigration courts87 when the agency tasked with “administer[ing] the 
nation’s lawful immigration system”88 does not have statutory authority over immigration judges 
and the BIA, thus splitting the asylum process down the middle.  Although the judges who sit on 
lower immigration courts and the BIA have taken a constitutional oath to perform the same such 
“administering” of the nation’s immigration laws as DHS officials,89 the department has no 
authority over them.  Undoubtedly, “Frankenstein[’s] monster”90 is not equipped to ensure that 
all asylum applicants, whether affirmative or defensive, receive adequate constitutional due 
process, but finally giving him the statutory tools he needs to succeed could mark the first step 
toward a much needed solution. 
II. THE AGENCY-AS-EXPERT MODEL 
 Despite the existence of a Nondelegation Doctrine,91 when designing administrative 
agencies, Congress grants significant authority to them to pursue policy solutions in their given 
area of practice.92  Because Congress often lacks the specialized knowledge needed to solve 
complex policy disputes, agency expertise plays a leading role in justifying the broad authority 
                                                             
84 See id. at 305-06 (an affirmative asylum application is sought by an individual on his own initiative, beginning 
when the individual voluntarily identifies himself to DHS, while a defensive applicant applies for asylum only after 
having been apprehended by DHS and placed in removal proceedings in immigration court); see also Immigration 
Court Independence, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR., https://www.immigrantjustice.org/issues/immigration-court-
independence.  
85 See The Attorney General’s Judges: How the U.S. Immigration Courts Became a Deportation Tool, SOUTHERN 
POVERTY L. CTR. (June 25, 2019), https://www.splcenter.org/20190625/attorney-generals-judges-how-us-
immigration-courts-became-deportation-tool (urging that improvement of the immigration court system is 
paramount due to the life-or-death stakes of many immigration cases).  
86 See Mayer, supra note 71.   
87 See Immigration Court Independence, supra note 84 (“Access to justice in the immigration court system, already 
crippled by backlogs and unacceptable disparities in decisionmaking, is being further diminished by highly 
politicized DOJ policies.”).  
88 See About Us, supra note 30; see also Homeland Security Act of 2002, 107 Pub. L. No. 296, 116 Stat. 2135 
(2002) (“[USCIS] shall establish national immigration services policies and priorities . . .”).  
89 See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 9.  
90 See Mayer, supra note 71.  
91 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United 
States . . . .”); see also Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991) (providing that Congress may not 
constitutionally delegate its legislative power to another branch of government).  
92 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472-76 (2001) (holding that the nondelegation doctrine is 
generally weak); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 321 (1936) (referencing 
Congress’s “unwisdom” and providing that the nondelegation doctrine is even more toothless in the realm of foreign 
affairs).  





bestowed upon administrative departments, and so should it in contemplating the steps the 
United States should take toward comprehensive reform of asylum adjudication.93  In addition to 
the general acknowledgement of the prominence of expertise in the field of administrative law, 
the importance of agency expertise is further evidenced by landmark decisions like Chevron94 
and the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).95   
Chevron made clear that “those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for 
administering the [statute] would be in a better position to [choose an appropriate policy].”96 
While statutes can be thought of like commands handed down from the legislature to the agency, 
sometimes those commands are not always straightforward.97  It is up to the agency to interpret 
Congress’s command in a reasonable way.98  Ambiguity is preferred, often intentionally left by 
Congress to allow agencies with superior knowledge and resources to do the bulk of statutory 
interpretation and implementation.99  
Passage of the APA further illustrates the courts’ heavy reliance on awarding deference 
to agency interpretations based on their concentrated skillset.  The APA mandates that federal 
judges affirm agency rules so long as they are not “arbitrary [and] capricious.”100   Deferring 
generally to agency expertise, review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow and 
does not allow a court to substitute its own judgment for that of the expert agency.101  Instead, 
                                                             
93 See Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to Understand Expertise in Administrative Law: The Problem and the 
Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1097, 1097 (2015) (“Expertise plays a starring role in administrative law.  
Congress established administrative agencies and often gives them substantial discretion because it lacks the 
expertise and political agreement to resolve the policy issues that are likely to arise under a statutory scheme.”).  
94 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
95 79 Pub. L. 404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).  
96 See 467 U.S. at 865 (emphasizing that Congress cannot possibly consider and deal with all of the questions that 
may arise under a given statutory scheme, and thus decides to “take [its] chances with the scheme devised by the 
agency”); see also Shapiro, supra note 93, at 1097  
The Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. required deference 
to agency constructions of ambiguous statutory language because agencies have greater expertise 
and political accountability concerning the policy issues involved in resolving an ambiguity.  
97 See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) (pointing out that Congress leaves “gaps” in legislation both 
explicitly and implicitly).  
98 See United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961) (holding that if an agency’s choice represents “a 
reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies,” the Court should “not disturb it”).  
99 See 467 U.S. at 843-44 (maintaining that when Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, such 
intentional ambiguity acts as an “express delegation of authority to the agency”).  
100 79 Pub. L. 404, 60 Stat. 237 § 10(e).  
101 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (holding that an agency 
must only examine relevant data and articulate a “satisfactory explanation” for its decision to be awarded judicial 
deference).  
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the court must only determine whether the agency’s decision was based on “reasoned 
decisionmaking.”102 
A. USING GONZALES AS A GUIDE IN “SPLIT AUTHORITY” SITUATIONS 
Although the Chevron decision and the implementation of the APA reaffirm the 
significance of agency expertise in administrative law, there is evidence that focus on expertise 
sometimes evades Congress’s thinking.103  Complicating Congress’s efforts to pass enabling 
statutes with agency expertise in mind is the existence of significant overlap among agencies 
regulating under the same statute.  For example, in Gonzales v. Oregon,104 the Attorney General 
issued an interpretive rule on Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, claiming he could do so under 
the authority granted to him in the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which also delegated 
significant power to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services.105  
Ultimately, the court in Gonzales held that when decisionmaking powers are shared among 
statutory actors, the agency with the most familiarity and policymaking expertise should be 
presumed to be the agency that has been delegated interpretive power for that issue.106 
Gonzales highlights a situation parallel to the one currently affecting asylum seekers: two 
agencies, with two notably different sets of specialized knowledge, given authority under the 
same statute to adjudicate in the same area.107  Because of the HSA’s structure, asylum 
applicants are split into two groups, their fate often dependent on which side of the divide they 
will fall.108  Agency expertise is emphasized in pursuit of uniformity, but such uniformity is 
lacking in the United States’ asylum process.109  Uniform application of the law is not only 
desirable, but constitutionally demanded.110  While necessary in all administrative agency 
contexts, the need for uniformity, and thus, the significance of expertise, is arguably even more 
                                                             
102 See Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962) (elaborating that “reasoned 
decisionmaking” refers to evidence that the agency articulated “any rational connection between the facts found and 
the choice made”).  
103 See Shapiro, supra note 93, at 1097 (“For a concept that is so central to administrative law, there has been a 
surprisingly impoverished understanding of expertise and its role in the rulemaking process.”).  
104 546 U.S. 243 (2006).  
105 See id. at 294-95 (highlighting that while the CSA states that physicians must obtain a registration from the 
Attorney General for some prescriptions, the Secretary of Health and Human Services has “exclusive authority over 
scientific and medical determinations”).  
106 See id. at 265 (holding that all decisions of a medical nature are to be made by the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services and the Secretary’s scientific and medical expertise “bind the Attorney General”).  
107 Compare 79 Pub. L. 404, 60 Stat. 237 § 451(b)(3) (transferring adjudication of asylum and refugee applications 
to DHS’s USCIS) with § 1102(g)(1) (granting the Attorney General authority over all laws relating to immigration 
and naturalization, including asylum).  
108 See supra notes 15 and 17 and accompanying text.  
109 See Paul Chaffin, Expertise and Immigration Administration: When Does Chevron Apply to BIA Interpretations 
of the INA?, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 503, 509 (2013) (explaining that Chevron’s goal when affording 
agencies decisionmaking deference is ultimately one of uniformity).  
110 See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 331 (1921) (“Our whole system of law is predicated on the general 
fundamental principle of equality of application of the law.  ‘All men are equal before the law,’ ‘This is a 
government of laws and not men. . .’”).   





apparent in asylum cases.111  The stakes of an immigration court proceeding are higher than 
many other agency adjudications, the consequences of an unfavorable decision often being 
deportation to a country that the individual originally fled seeking not just economic, but also 
personal security.112   
Like parties involved in traditional Article III court proceedings,113 migrants whose 
asylum claims come before the immigration court have a right to notice of the legal 
consequences of their actions and an opportunity to be heard before an impartial tribunal.114  
While this point, solidified in the nation’s founding document, is not debatable, the asylum 
process is complicated by questions about which administrative agency truly has the expertise 
necessary to oversee the fair adjudication of asylum claims.115  Echoing the Court’s view in 
Gonzales, it should be presumed that Congress intended to grant authority to the agency most 
constitutionally suited to oversee the asylum process116 and guarantee that regardless if asylum 
claims are heard by asylum officers or the immigration court, all applicants are in equal receipt 
of robust due process.117  
B. DHS V. DOJ – WHICH IS THE ASYLUM EXPERT? 
Just as the Court in Gonzales declared that the Attorney General was not the appropriate 
official to issue science-intensive rules, nor should the Attorney General oversee the lower 
immigration courts and the BIA in the adjudication of asylum claims.118  First, the HSA’s 
                                                             
111 See Chaffin, supra note 109, at 503 (setting forth that uniformity is “especially desirable” in the immigration 
context).  
112 See Fleeing For Our Lives: Central American Migrant Crisis, AMNESTY INT’L, 
https://www.amnestyusa.org/fleeing-for-our-lives-central-american-migrant-crisis/ (providing that since 2014, there 
has been a 432% increase in asylum applications from countries like Mexico, Belize, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and 
Panama, many of which indicate that the applicants are “fleeing for their lives”). 
113 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 9 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and 
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.  The Judges, both of the supreme 
and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their 
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”).  
114 See Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (“The neutrality requirement helps to guarantee that life, 
liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law.”); 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard.”); 
see also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (“An elementary and fundamental 
requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under 
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections.”).  
115 See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 9, at 307 (explaining that while both DHS asylum officers and DOJ immigration 
judges make asylum decisions, DHS asylum officers may also “defer” claims to the immigration court, which 
happens in a large portion of cases).  
116 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 266 (2006) (stating that the Attorney General’s attempt to claim authority 
over determining appropriate medical standards would be at odds with congressional commentary on the CSA’s 
regulation of medical practice).  
117 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) (advocating that the extent to which procedural due process 
must be afforded is influenced by the extent to which an individual has “suffer[ed] grievous loss”).  
118 See infra Part III. 
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legislative history points to Congress’s intention to handcraft DHS as the expert agency on 
homeland security issues, one of which involves determining who can and cannot enter the 
United States.119  Second, determining the validity of one’s asylum claim involves both fact and 
emotion-intensive inquiries into countless aspects of the applicant’s life and home country 
conditions, a task that, as evidenced by ongoing disparities, the DOJ does not have the resources 
or specialized knowledge to adequately accomplish.120  Last, at a baseline, a study of how each 
agency speaks about its own mission provides further evidence that DHS, and not the DOJ, is the 
expert agency on immigration.121   
Congressional rhetoric leading up to the passage of the HSA points to members’ intense 
focus on authority over immigration matters as they drafted the department’s enabling 
legislation.122  Members urged that as a result of the events of 9/11, “America must look with 
new and urgent scrutiny at illegal immigration, as well as at how to better screen the more than 
200 million people traveling to [the] country each year.”123  It was clear—immigration was at the 
forefront of lawmakers’ minds.124  Congress was not only concerned with immigration in a 
national security sense,125 but also with drafting the legislation in a way that finally gave 
immigration matters the “focus and attention they deserve.”126  The new department, while 
largely focused on increasing domestic defenses to promote security, also valued aiding 
immigrants through the citizenship process and working toward “long-overdue” immigration 
reforms.127 
To address the complexities that accompany a major government merger, Congress held 
hearings, oftentimes focusing specifically on immigration-related issues.128  During one hearing, 
members of Congress questioned immigration experts in an attempt to determine whether visas 
should continue to be issued by the Department of State, or rather, if that authority should be 
transferred to the new DHS.129  Overwhelmingly, testifying experts agreed that the visa function 
should be transferred from the Department of State to DHS in an effort to “form a single, unified 
Government entity responsible for the formulation and implementation of U.S. immigration 
                                                             
119 See infra note 122 and accompanying text.  
120 See infra notes 134 and 135 and accompanying text.  
121 See infra note 158 and accompanying text.  
122 STAFF OF S. GOV’T AFFAIRS COMM., 107TH CONG., CASE FOR THE HOMELAND SECURITY DEPARTMENT 
ENDORSED BY BIPARTISAN VOTE OF SENATE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (Comm. Print 2002).  
123 Id. at 2.  
124 See id. (emphasizing that persisting “internal conflicts” surrounding immigration needed to be dealt with in the 
DHS’s enabling legislation).  
125 See id. at 1 (referring to “seizing a historic opportunity” to reform the way the U.S. addresses its national security 
vulnerabilities).  
126 Id. at 2.  
127 STAFF OF S. GOV’T AFFAIRS COMM, supra note 122. 
128 See Role of Immigration in the Department of Homeland Security Pursuant to H.R. 5005, The Homeland Security 
Act of 2002: Hearing on H.R. 5005 Before the Subcomm. On Immigration, Border Sec., And Claims, 107th Cong. 2 
(2002) (statement of Congressman Elton Gallegly) (pointing out that many immigration questions remained).  
129 See id. at 3 (observing that “it is unclear” why a “hybrid structure” between the State Department and DHS 
would be created with respect to the issuance of visas).  





policy.”130  However, at the same time that advocates argued for a uniform, expert immigration 
agency with respect to the issuance of visas, no such concerns were raised regarding the split 
adjudication of asylum claims.131 
Ultimately, Congress’s failure to press immigration experts on the potential repercussions 
of such divided authority in the asylum context has resulted in an unequal delivery of justice.132  
Currently, there are eight regional asylum offices, where DHS asylum officers make asylum 
determinations in a non-adversarial setting, and fifty-eight DOJ immigration courts, each with a 
varying number of judges, positioned throughout the country.133  The data depicting how asylum 
decisions are being dealt in the immigration courts reveal serious disparities,134 inconsistencies 
that are not evidenced in similar decisions being made by DHS asylum officers.135  Although 
complete uniformity may be unrealistic, one would expect little variation from one adjudicator to 
another, especially in their analysis of the applicable legal standard.136  Unfortunately, such 
controlled but acceptable variation does not exist in the immigration courts.137  Instead, they are 
riddled with extremes,138 discrepancies existing not just between courts, but also within them.139   
Such inconsistencies among and within the immigration courts cannot be ignored, as they 
are directly attributable to the lack of immigration expertise within the department tasked with 
                                                             
130 See id. at 7 (statement of John. R. Ratigan, Immigration Consultant, Baker & McKenzie) (advocating that while 
his position on creating a “single, unified” immigration entity in charge of issuing visas may seem “radical,” it is in 
fact a “rational and sensible change” that would advance a “single policymaking and implementing body in the field 
of immigration”).  
131 See id. at 66 (statement of Dana Marks Keener, President, National Association of Immigration Judges) 
(acknowledging that some asylum applicants are placed in proceedings before the immigration court but failing to 
go so far as to point out potential problems arising from this divided system of asylum adjudication).  
132 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 17-72, VARIATION EXISTS IN OUTCOMES OF APPLICATIONS 
ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS AND JUDGES (2016) (uncovering “significant variations in the outcomes across 
immigration courts and judges.”).  
133 Jeanne Atkinson & Michelle Mendez et al., The Human Rights of Asylum Seekers in the United States, INTER-
AM. COMMISSION ON HUM. RTS. (Dec. 2, 2016) at 4.  
134 See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 9, at 342-43 (For example, “female immigration judges granted asylum at a rate 
of 53.8%, while male judges granted asylum at a rate of 37.7%.  An asylum applicant assigned by chance to a 
female judge therefore had a 44% better chance of prevailing than an applicant assigned to a male judge.”); see also 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 132 (revealing that asylum applications before the Atlanta 
Immigration Court had a grant rate of 6%, while the New York Immigration Court granted asylum at a rate of 54%).  
135 See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 9, at 342-43 (emphasizing that, “In contrast, no appreciable difference existed in 
the grant rates of male and female [DHS] asylum officers.”) (emphasis added).  
136 See id. at 306 (differentiating that while variation should be minimal among adjudicators with respect to legal 
analysis, assessments of credibility may be more prone to variation based on the subjective inquiry required).  
137 See TRACIMMIGRATION, IMMIGRATION JUDGE REPORTS – ASYLUM (2018), available at 
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judgereports/ (documenting that in the Houston, Dallas, Charlotte, and Las 
Vegas regional courts, statistics indicate that applicants are granted asylum at a rate of nearly 0%).  
138 See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 9, at 328 (providing that Chinese asylum seekers had a 7% success rate in 
Atlanta, 76% success rate in Orlando, and a 47% success rate nationwide).  
139 See id. at 335-36 (describing that in Miami three judges granted asylum at rates of only 3%, 5%, and 6%, while 
three different judges granted asylum at 75%, 61%, and 38%).  
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overseeing them—the DOJ.140  The absence of specialized immigration knowledge within the 
DOJ is not something that can be easily corrected.141  As has been previously emphasized, 
immigration law is complicated,142 and DHS is the only administrative agency with the protocols 
in place to make life-altering asylum decisions in a constitutionally permissible way.143  
Although the structure of the HSA makes DHS asylum officers and DOJ immigration judges 
equally responsible for using their knowledge and training to determine whether an asylum 
applicant’s story is true, and would thus render the individual eligible for asylum in the United 
States,144 the resources deployed by the DOJ to ensure that such responsibility is being taken 
seriously are anything but equal to those utilized by DHS.145  
Making a final asylum decision requires both legal expertise and emotional intuition.146 
Officials must perform an intense assessment of credibility about the applicant’s description of 
her personal experiences and likelihood of actual or threatened persecution if forced to return to 
her country of origin.147  To do that, DHS requires every asylum officer to complete an intensive 
five-week basic training module, which includes periodic testing.148  Further, once asylum 
officers are in their regional placements, regional offices conduct four hours of training each 
week on prominent legal issues, country conditions, and procedures.149  A supervisory officer, 
who has been vetted, trained, and tested on immigration law, reviews each asylum decision made 
by regional asylum officers before the decision is finalized.150  Above the supervisory officer is a 
training officer who then re-reviews the supervisor’s judgement and reports to the Regional 
Director when inconsistencies arise.151  
                                                             
140 See id. at 378 (comparing the current way in which asylum decisions are made by DOJ immigration judges to “a 
spin of the wheel of chance”).  
141 See, e.g. Governor in Council Appointed Members, IMMIGR. AND REFUGEE BOARD OF CANADA, https://irb-
cisr.gc.ca/en/jobs/Pages/MemComEmpl.aspx (last updated June 25, 2018) (outlining that Canadian immigration 
judges are selected through a rigorous hiring process that requires evaluation of the applicant’s competency, self-
control, and cultural sensibility, among other factors).  
142 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.  
143 See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 9, at 381 (pointing out that DHS asylum officers currently receive much more 
“initial and ongoing training” than that required of DOJ’s immigration judges).  
144 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.  
145 See IMMIGRATION JUDGE REPORTS – ASYLUM, supra note 137 (documenting the DOJ’s lackluster effort to 
appoint judges of diverse professional backgrounds with five of the six Atlanta immigration judges having a law 
enforcement background and four of those five previously serving as federal prosecutors prior to becoming 
immigration judges).  
146 See Credible and Reasonable Fear Interviews, IMMIGR. JUST. CAMPAIGN, https://www.immigrationjustice.us/get-
trained/cfi-rfi (establishing that the credible fear interviews initially required by those seeking asylum task asylum 
officers with determining an applicant’s eligibility based on his direct testimony regarding his need for protection 
from persecution).  
147 See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 9, at 306.  
148 Id. at 311.  
149 Id.  
150 Id.  
151 Id. 





 In all, an asylum decision rendered by a DHS asylum officer is not definitive until it has 
been approved by three—and, in difficult and inconsistent cases, four—immigration law 
professionals.152  In addition, each regional office hires staff dedicated solely to conducting 
country research, participating in conference calls with headquarters, and identifying emerging 
patterns in asylum claims, all of which later gets reported to asylum officers to aid them in 
making their decisions.153   
While it is true that the DOJ provides some training, a 2018 training manual reveals that a 
recent educational program for incoming immigration judges lasted only three days from around 
8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.154  The training consisted mainly of PowerPoint presentations and 
breakout sessions, rather than intensive study and subsequent testing on substantive legal 
material, and did not appear to be compulsory.155  The DOJ cannot teach immigration law over 
the course of three days in a style reminiscent of a first-year law school class.156  Unlike the DOJ, 
DHS has put in place the training and safeguards needed in order to legitimately call itself the 
expert agency in asylum adjudication.157 
Even with DHS’s superior knowledge in immigration matters readily apparent, the 
agency’s own words and mission additionally support its immigration expertise.158  A brief 
search of DHS’s website reveals “Secur[ing] U.S. Borders and Approaches,” as one of the 
department’s “core missions.” 159  Within the description of this mission, it mentions 
immigration three times.160  One of the four goals of the mission is to “Enforce U.S. Immigration 
Laws”—DHS further referencing its “responsibility” to “faithfully” do so.161  A similar search of 
the DOJ’s mission statement reveals no mention of immigration specifically, though it does 
                                                             
152 Ramji-Nogales, supra note 9, at 311.  
153 Id.  
154 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 2018 EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR 
IMMIGRATION REVIEW LEGAL TRAINING PROGRAM (June 2018) (unpublished document obtained by FOIA request 
by Hoppock Law Firm and published online by American Immigration Lawyers Association), 
https://www.aila.org/infonet/eoir-2018-training-program-judges.  
155 See id. 
156 See Michelle Mark, Jeff Sessions Said Immigrants Should ‘Wait Their Turn’ to Come to the US – Here’s How 
Complicated that Process Can Be, BUS. INSIDER (May 3, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-green-
card-visa-legal-immigration-us-news-trump-2017-4 (depicting various pathways and roadblocks to legally 
immigrating to the United States that make lawful immigration “challenging, if not impossible”). 
157 Asylum Division Training Programs, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVICES (last updated Dec. 19, 2016), 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/asylum-division-training-programs (“All Asylum 
Officers are required to attend and complete the Asylum Officer Basic Training Course (AOBTC), which is a 
national training course that is specific to asylum adjudications.  Instructors for this course are from HQ Asylum 
Division and field Asylum offices, as well as non-governmental organizations, law schools, and the UNHCR.”).  
158 Secure U.S. Borders and Approaches, THE U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
https://www.dhs.gov/administer-immigration-laws (last updated July 5, 2019). 
159 Id.  
160 See id. (outlining that DHS is responsible for addressing individuals who ignore lawful immigration processes, 
enforcing immigration laws, and properly administering immigration benefits) (emphasis added).  
161 See id. (“It is DHS’s responsibility to faithfully execute and enforce the immigration laws of the United States in 
a manner that eliminates [sic] abuses.”).  
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describe the department’s duty to “enforce the law” and “defend the interests of the United States 
according to the law” more generally.162  The closest the DOJ comes to referencing its 
responsibilities vis-à-vis immigration is to describe its role in “ensur[ing] public safety against 
threats foreign and domestic.”163  
Though Congress clearly intended to handcraft an expert immigration agency in the wake 
of 9/11,164 and DHS’s superior knowledge in handling both legally and emotionally complex 
asylum adjudications is evidenced by its ongoing efforts to require staff to undergo rigorous 
training and continuing education,165 the HSA’s business remains unfinished.166  Even the DOJ 
does not attempt to coin itself as an agency with expert knowledge and interest in immigration,167 
and neither should the U.S. Congress.168  While such “split authority” is not uncommon 
throughout statutory schemes,169 Congress should take a page from the Supreme Court’s 
Gonzales opinion and put an end to the divided authority over asylum adjudication that does 
nothing more than perpetuate injustice.170 
C. A WELCOMED CONSEQUENCE – INCREASED DHS INDEPENDENCE 
Though relying on the agency-as-expert model is persuasive, the argument to relocate the 
lower immigration courts and the BIA does not stop there.  Critics are quick to point out that 
agencies cannot base decisionmaking purely on expertise because of the existence of countless 
fluctuating factors that agencies must balance, some of which are political.171  This point is not 
up for debate—it’s true.172  Though taken,173 the skepticism surrounding an agency’s ability to 
independently assert its expertise in the decisionmaking process does not have to be understood 
                                                             
162 About DOJ, THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/about.  
163 Id.  
164 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.  
165 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.  
166 See Assembly Line Injustice: Blueprint to Reform America’s Immigration Courts, APPLESEED (May 2009) at 15 
(urging that it makes little sense that asylum officers receive more intensive training than the immigration judges 
who may be tasked with reviewing their decisions upon appeal).  
167 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.  
168 See infra Part.III.  
169 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.  
170 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.  
171 See Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 970 (1997) (“At its core, the argument 
is that administrative action . . . cannot be understood in the neutral, scientific, apolitical sense in which it was 
understood by the founders of the administrative state.  It is instead now seen by all to be essentially ‘political’—
involving an essentially ‘political choice.’”).  
172 See id. at 967-68 (emphasizing that a simple dichotomy between law and politics does not exist and that tension 
between the legal and the political will endure even when agencies attempt to make decisions based on expert 
knowledge alone).  
173 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The 
accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day.  It does come, however slowly, from the generative force of 
unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested assertion of authority.”).  





as a concession to the core argument made in this Comment.174  Rather, relocating the 
immigration court and the BIA to DHS will lead to increased independence throughout the 
agency175 and further insulate the immigration courts from political influence when overseeing 
the adjudication of asylum claims. 
 Despite the commonly understood theory that agencies adhere neatly to a binary 
division—either executive or independent—it is impossible to pin down a single form by which 
an agency can earn its “independent” status.176  Instead, to accurately determine an agency’s 
level of independence, various factors stemming from the agency’s enabling legislation must be 
considered.177  At the heart of an analysis of agency independence is an effort to deconstruct the 
agency’s relationship to the President.178  Though the consensus view believes that the dividing 
line between independent and executive agencies lies in the presence of for-cause removal 
protection,179 not all agencies considered independent possess such a clause.180 
 Relocating the immigration court system to DHS would grant the agency with litigation 
authority, an added element of agency power that would promote the use of impartial, 
independent expertise while overseeing asylum adjudications.181  Since 1966, the DOJ has had 
centralized-agency litigation authority.182  The default understanding is that the Attorney General 
will spearhead all litigation that names the United States as a party, “[e]xcept as otherwise 
authorized by law.”183  While Congress has outlined some exceptions to the centralized-litigation 
                                                             
174 See Kirti Datla, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (And Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 769 
(2013) (“As it turns out, there is no single feature, structural or functional, that every agency thought of as 
independent shares—not even the for-cause removal provision commonly associated with independence.”).  
175 See id. at 769-70 (explaining that agency independence should be understood as falling within a spectrum and 
that numerous factors in an agency’s enabling legislation may allow it to function as an independent, expertise-
focused rule maker).  
176 See id. at 772 (“Agencies cannot be neatly divided into two categories.  Independent agencies are almost always 
defined as agencies with a for-cause removal provision limiting the President’s power to remove the agencies’ heads 
to cases of ‘inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.’  But, as some scholars acknowledge, the so-
called independent agencies do not share a single form.”).   
177 See id. (analyzing removal protection, specified tenure, multimember structure, partisan balance requirements, 
litigation authority, budget and congressional communication authority, and adjudication authority). 
178 See id. at 773 (explaining that achieving status as an independent agency signifies limitations on presidential 
control that restrict the President beyond what is specified in the agency’s enabling legislation). 
179 See Datla, supra note 174, at 778 (basing such view on the 1935 decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. United 
States); see also Humphreys Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 602 (1935) (holding that the President could 
not remove a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) official based solely on their policy disagreements and declaring the 
FTC an agency completely independent of presidential control).  
180 See Adrian Vermuele, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1165 (2013) (“There are 
many important agencies that are conventionally treated as independent, yet whose heads lack for-cause tenure 
protection.”); see also Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of 
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1138 (2000). 
181 See Datla, supra note 174, at 777 (arguing that the goal of formulating independent agencies is to promote 
impartial expertise in administrative proceedings and rulemaking).  
182 See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (reserving the “conduct of litigation” to the DOJ).  
183 Id.  
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authority the DOJ currently possesses, the exceptions are not systematic.184  Though Congress’s 
decisionmaking process may not be predictable, history shows that such exceptions are 
possible.185  If Congress grants DHS litigation authority by allowing it to oversee the 
immigration court system, it will increase both the agency’s level of independence from the 
executive and its ability to ensure consistent asylum determinations made by both DHS asylum 
officers and immigration judges.186 
III. RECOMMENDATION 
The Deference Principle of administrative law addresses those statutory situations that 
leave practitioners scratching their heads—“split authority” circumstances like the one described 
throughout this Comment.187  Courts must show deference to agency judgments based on the 
agency’s superior technical knowledge,188 and though the judgments made by immigration 
judges are awarded deference every day, there is no evidence that the DOJ possesses such 
knowledge, education, or training in the area of immigration.189   Instead, immigration lawyers 
who regularly appear before the immigration courts speak of a high level of unprofessionalism 
among immigration judges who approach asylum claims with a “presumptive skepticism” rather 
than as neutral arbiters of justice.190  Former immigration judges themselves have gone so far as 
                                                             
184 See Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Battle That Never Was: Congress, the White House, and Agency Litigation 
Authority, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 207-08 (1998) (explaining that in decentralizing litigation authority for 
some administrative agencies, Congress must work against an intense backdrop of often conflicting preferences).   
185 Cf. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2604(e), 2604(f), 2606 (granting the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) litigation 
authority over specific violations of the Toxic Substances Control Act); see also id. § 56(a)-(c) (2006) (empowering 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) with broad litigation authority).  
186 See Datla, supra note 174, at 801 (“The effect of independent litigation authority is a degree of insulation from 
executive control.”).  
187 The Deference Principle, 2 STATE ENV’T  L. § 15:48 (2018).  
188 Id.  
Courts reviewing an agency’s actions regularly comment that they lack the expertise necessary to 
“second-guess” the agency’s conclusions.  Asserting that they cannot match the agency’s technical 
knowledge, courts unanimously endorse the principle that they must defer to the agency’s 
expertise in conducting judicial review of agency decisionmaking. 
189 Hamed Aleaziz, Being an Immigration Judge Was Their Dream. Under Trump, It Became Untenable, BUZZFEED 
NEWS (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz/immigration-policy-judge-resign-trump 
(describing a training conference in which a former immigration judge, Rebecca Jamil, states, “The entire 
conference was profoundly disturbing.  Do things as fast as possible.  There was an overarching theme of 
disbelieving aliens and their claims and how to remove people faster.  That is not what I saw my job as an 
immigration judge to be.  I was not trained to do that.”).  
190 See Assembly Line Injustice: Blueprint to Reform America’s Immigration Courts, supra note 166, at 12 
(describing one immigration judge’s conduct as “so egregious that law school clinics will not allow their students to 
appear in front of her”); see also See The Attorney General’s Judges: How the U.S. Immigration Courts Became a 
Deportation Tool, supra note 85, at 12 (“[I]mmigration judges approached asylum claims with ‘presumptive 
skepticism’ and often questioned respondents the way a government attorney would on cross-examination, rather 
than conducting proceedings in a fair and neutral manner.”).  





to reveal, “[T]here isn’t even any attempt at proper training.  The whole indoctrination is you’re 
not judges, you’re really enforcement . . . .”191 
Despite the constant skepticism and increased scrutiny that DHS has faced both 
historically and under the current administration, nothing inherently wrong or corrupt exists 
regarding the officials that comprise the agency.  In fact, DHS has put plans in place in an effort 
to retain employees with highly specialized knowledge who have often worked with the 
department from its beginning.192  The issue stems not from the government officials who 
comprise the department, rather, the real problem comes from the department’s enabling 
legislation: 187 pages of statutory slice and dice between existing agencies, executive offices, 
and various other administrative actors.193  
The HSA in its current form does not work,194 and the unfinished statutory business has 
led to a deprivation of asylum seekers’ due process rights.195  Considering the abundant 
importance placed on agency expertise in the world of administrative law, Congress should 
amend the HSA to transfer the immigration court and the BIA to DHS.  By removing the courts 
from the DOJ, Congress would place them where they have rightly belonged since DHS’s 
creation seventeen years ago.196   
Seven years before DHS’s creation, Justice Breyer, in his book, BREAKING THE VICIOUS 
CIRCLE TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION,197 warned against agencies “implicitly and often 
inconsistently” making decisions.198  Currently, the nation faces the exact situation Justice 
Breyer warned of.  Immigration judges who are ill-prepared and ill-equipped are arbitrarily 
making life-or-death asylum decisions.199  Removing these judges from an agency unable to 
train, counsel, and supervise them appropriately and placing them under DHS control, which 
holds itself out as an expert in immigration and has the training procedures in place to show for 
                                                             
191 See The Attorney General’s Judges: How the U.S. Immigration Courts Became a Deportation Tool, supra note 
85, at 18.  
192 See Recruitment and Retention Incentives, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY MGMT. DIRECTIVE SYS. (March 31, 
2004) at 19 (describing the retention allowances provided by DHS to current employees with unusually high or 
unique qualifications in an effort to retain the employee).  
193 Homeland Security Act of 2002, 107 Pub. L. No. 296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).  
194 See Thessin, supra note 70, at 514 (“Although some consolidation of the myriad agency components that are 
charged with homeland security is needed, the HSA is too broad in scope and transfers too much power to the 
President.”).  
195 See Immigration Court Independence, supra note 84 (“[T]he DOJ and its component, the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review (EOIR), have introduced or perpetuated a number of policies that are further diminishing 
weakened due process protections while exacerbating inefficiencies.”).  
196 Glasser & Grunwald, supra note 31.  
197 Stephen Breyer, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 65 (1995).  
198 Id.  
199 See Ilyce Shugall, Op Ed: Why I Resigned as an Immigration Judge, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2019), 
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-08-03/immigration-court-judge-asylum-trump-policies (describing the 
unworkable and unattainable performance metrics the DOJ is imposing upon immigration judges and the 
“demoralizing” effect they’ve had).  
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it, will signify an incremental step toward much needed immigration reform in the United 
States.200  
A. PROCEDURAL “NEXT STEPS” 
Justice demands that administrative officials have expertise in their respective agency 
missions.201  Just as society rightfully expects a heart surgeon to be completely versed in 
cardiovascular health, and an oncologist to have superior knowledge on the treatment of cancer, 
asylum applicants whose lives depend on an administrative agency’s decision must have 
confidence in its ability to offer a professional, objective “diagnosis.”202  Though complete 
public trust in the expert judgment of administrative agencies would be ideal,203 no easy solution 
exists when attempting to improve difficult, life-altering processes like those that take place in 
the immigration court system.204   
While this Comment relies on the agency-as-expert model to argue that Congress should 
relocate the lower immigration courts and the BIA to DHS,205 the push for progress must go 
further.  Admittedly, the agency-as-expert model is not fool proof, and DHS must strictly adhere 
to the APA to ensure that DHS fully lives up to its potential as the immigration expert.206  
 To further provide for a robust system of due process in the immigration court, upon 
transfer to DHS, Congress should require immigration judges, both on lower immigration courts 
and the BIA, to become official administrative law judges (ALJs),207 subject to all APA 
procedures and guidelines.  While the current immigration court system has a reputation of 
lackluster hiring procedures,208 ALJ appointments follow APA standards and require judges to 
                                                             
200 See supra Part.II.B.  
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203 See Shapiro, supra note 93, at 1138 (describing the ongoing challenge the United States faces in striving to 
“legitimize” public administration).  
204 See Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3169 (2010) (emphasizing the vast complexity 
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207 See Administrative Law Judges, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/administrative-law/administrative-law-judges/ 
(last updated 2019) (“In the United States, an administrative law judge, or ALJ, serves as the judge and trier of fact 
who presides over administrative hearings.”).  
208 See 2019 Update Report – Reforming the Immigration System – Proposals to Promote Independence, Fairness, 
Efficiency, and Professionalism in the Adjudication of Removal Cases, supra note 26 (explaining that public 
skepticism about the immigration court system stems partially due to allegations of politicized, non-credential based 
hiring).  





complete a four-hour written and oral exam before a panel prior to taking the bench.209  Notably, 
the ALJ appointment process is the “only one based on merit in the United States.”210  With that, 
the Attorney General should no longer appoint immigration judges to serve at his or her 
pleasure.211  Rather, DHS should provide oversight and hire these judges based on ability and 
proven expertise in immigration law.  Congress can implement this procedural next step 
relatively easily, as DHS asylum officers already undergo extensive training before earning the 
privilege to render asylum decisions.212 
CONCLUSION 
The United States cannot turn away asylum seekers.213  Óscar and Valeria had a legal 
right to present themselves at the border and request asylum.214  The United States denied them 
of that right, and the United States must rectify such injustices.215  Relocating the immigration 
court system to DHS will reduce the feeling of impossibility that DOJ immigration judges 
currently face and provide them with the resources they need to deliver due process to those who 
stand before them.216  Most importantly, the relocation will allow asylum applicants to present 
their claims with confidence, rather than fear, with assurance that regardless of whether they are 
presenting their claims before an asylum officer or immigration judge, they have the same shot at 
success.217 
 While not a perfect agency, DHS is in the best position to oversee asylum adjudication 
and the immigration court system.218   Longstanding emphasis on agency expertise,219 the HSA’s 
legislative history,220 the DOJ’s inability to apply niche-level knowledge when overseeing 
asylum determinations made by immigration judges,221 and DHS and DOJ’s own words all 
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support relocation.222  Congress should amend the HSA to relocate the immigration court and the 
BIA from the DOJ to DHS, finally permitting the executive agency where expertise in 
immigration matters truly lies to oversee all asylum adjudications.223  
True immigration reform continues to evade the United States all while its bronze lady 
urges, “Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free . . . .”224  
Those very words lead tens of thousands of asylum seekers to knock on the nation’s door each 
year,225  and they too should be the words used to guide the country in its pursuit of a just asylum 
adjudication process.226 
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